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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
CRr'..l( ~ CALDWELL and ROBERT 
.E. COVINGTON, dba CALDWELL 
AND COVINGTON, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
ANSCriUTZ DRILLING COMPANY, 
li\C., a corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
No. 
9587 
BRIEF OF APPELL~TS 
Appeal from the Judgment of the Fourth Judicial District 
Court for Uintah County, Hon. Joseph E. Nelson, Judge. 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action v.rherein plaintiffs seek a decree of specific 
performance requiring defendant to assign and deliver certain 
oil and gas leases to the plaintiffs or in the alternative, if the 
same cannot be done, to require defendant to pay damages for 
breach of contract. 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to a jury. At the conclusion of plain-
tiff's evidence and after a stipulation by the defendant, the 
trial court granted defendant's motion to dismiss. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs seek reversal of the judgment of dismissal and 
a new trial. 
STATEMEN1. OF FACTS 
Plaintiffs respectfully advise the Court that the record filed 
with the above-entitled Court by the Clerk of Uintah County 
is not numbered by page and it will be, therefore, necessary 
to refer to pleadings and other documents by their designation 
and not by page number. 
Plaintiffs and defendant corporation are engaged sepa · 
ratel y in exploration for oil and gas, together with buying 
and selling oil and gas leases. On February 16, 1961, the 
plaintiffs telephoned the defendant corporation in Denver, 
Colorado, and talked with H. 0. Lynch, its president, stating 
that they '\vould be willing to pay a certain price per acre for 
certain oil and gas leases held by the defendant, and requested 
the defendant to prepare a contract of sale incorporating therein 
the proposed terms of sale and to forward the same to plaintiffs' 
office in Vernal, Utah, for execution. The contract of sale was 
prepared by the defendant and signed. It was then mailed to 
plaintiffs' office in Vernal, Utah, on February 17, 1961. (De-
fendant's Answer and Affidavit of H. 0. Lynch). 
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Paragraph nine of the contract stated: 
"This contract must be executed by buyer and the 
earnest money and executed copy of this contract re-
ceived by seller on or before February 23, 1961, or 
this contract is null and void, and the seller and buyer 
is relieved of any obligations hereunder.'' 
(Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 3) 
Paragraph four of the contract required that upon execu-
tion of the contract that buyer deliver seller a certified check 
in the amount of one-fourth of the purchase price. (Plaintiffs' 
Exhibit No. 3). 
On the 22nd day of February, 1961, one of the plaintiffs 
telephoned the defendant in Denver, Colorado, and talked 
with its president, H. 0. Lynch, concerning the time limitation 
set forth in the contract and informed Lynch that because of 
the holiday occurring on this date, they would be unable to 
obtain a certified check and forward the same to defendant 
in Denver within the time required in the contract. Lynch 
then told plaintiffs that paragraph No. 9 need not be complied 
with as long as it was understood that a deal had been made 
(Tr. 101). 
The defendant maintains that a time extension was given 
the plaintiffs but only to the 24th day of February, 1961. (See 
defendant's Answer to plaintiffs' Complaint) . 
The plaintiffs, in reliance upon the conversation with 
Lynch, contacted A. M. Alloway, their attorney in Denver, 
Colorado, and asked if he would execute the contract with the 
defendant in Denver at its office (Tr. 11). At approximatley 
2:50 p.m. on the 24th day of February, 1961, Alloway received 
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the contract by n1ail from plaintiffs with written authority to 
sign the same on their behalf. Alloway then went to defend-
ant's office to discuss execution of the contract and ~o suggest 
some proposed minor changes in the contract (Tr. 51, 52, 53). 
At this time, Alloway talked to Lynch and was told that 
defendant would not accept any of the suggested changes 
made by Alloway (Tr. 54). Alloway then told Lynch that he 
would execute the contract for the planitiffs in its present form 
and tendered his personal check to Lynch in the amount 
required as earnest money in the agreement. Lynch then 
stated that he would not accept a personal check and demanded 
that the check be certified. (Tr. 56, Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 7). 
Alloway then asked Lynch if he would accept cash but was 
told that cash was not acceptable (Tr. 59). Lynch also said 
that the defendant had received a better offer for the leases 
(Tr. 57). 
Alloway immediately went to the bank in a nearby building 
and was informed by the bank that no checks could be cer-
tified nor could cashiers' checks be issued after the hour of 
3:00 p.m. (Tr. 57, 58). He then returned to defendant's 
office and was told by Mr. Wakefield, another officer of de-
fendant corporation, that Lynch had gone home. Alloway 
explained his inability to get his check certified because of the 
late hour and requested Wakefield to accept the check. Wake-
field refused to do this (Tr. 58, 59). 
The following morning, Alloway telephoned Lynch and 
offered a check for the full purchase price stated in the contract 
but Lynch refused to accept the same (Tr. 61). 
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POINT URGED FOR REVERSAL 
TI-IAT 11 HE COURT BELOW ERRED IN DIRECTING 
A VERDICT IN FAVOR OF THE DEFENDANT AND 
AGAINST THE PLAINTIFFS AND SHOULD HAVE 
GRANTED PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
ARGUMENT 
THAT THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN DIRECTING 
A VERDICT IN FAVOR OF THE DEFENDANT AND 
AGAINST THE PLAINTIFFS AND SHOULD HAVE 
GRANTED PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
In order to properly review the proceedings and points 
of law involved, plaintiffs will treat defendant's motion and 
the trial Court's order of dismissal as one for a directed verdict 
as .the evidence was heard by the Court sitting with a jury. 
Plaintiffs' evidence adduced at the trial, coupled with the 
pleadings and stipulation of the defendant, clearly shows that 
there was a waiver by defendant of the terms of paragraph nine 
of the contract in question. 
There was a dtspute between the parties concerning the 
extent of the waiver admittedly granted by defendant. This 
issue, being one of fact, should have been submitted to the 
jury. Counsel for defendant also made the following stipulation 
at the trial and at the conclusion of plaintiffs' evidence: 
"We offer to stipulate that if Mr. Craig Caldwell, one of the 
plaintiffs herein, were present and called as a witness, he would 
testify in substance and effect as follows: 
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((On February 22, 1961, I contacted Mr. Lynch by 
telephone and informed him that because of the holiday 
of February 22, 1961, that I could not deliver a certified 
check in the amount of $3,487.89, as earnest money 
and as provided in paragraph 4 of said contract. Mr. 
Lynch informed me that the deal was made and that 1 
need not be concerned about the time element specified 
in paragraph 9 of said contract" (Tr. 101). 
It is plaintiffs' contention that defendant should have 
given them a reasonable time in which to obtain a certified 
check to be presented as earnest money as they had accepted 
defendant's offer. The authorities agree with this view. See 
1 Williston on Contracts, 3rd Edition, ( 1957) at page 171, 
Section 53, wherein the author states: 
((Not infrequently an offeror who has imposed a 
limit of time in his offer does not care to insist upon 
it and by further negotiations may indicate a con-
tinued willingness to stand by the terms of his offer. 
Any such manifestation of continued willingness in 
effect is a new offer which may be accepted and if 
accepted will ripen into a contract." 
Plaintiffs respectfully submit that defendant, after receiv-
ing a better offer for the ]eases, did everything possible to 
avoid the contract and deliberately connived to thwart payment 
of the earnest money. The only possible reason for requiring a 
certified check would be to guarantee payment. When certifi-
cation could not be obtained, cash should certainly suffice. 
Defendant should not be permitted to mislead the plaintiffs in 
an effort to avoid receiving payment. See Schaeffer vs. Coldren, 
23 7 Penn. 77, 85 Atlantic 98, wherein the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania said: 
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"One party to a contract may not, by agreeing to 
a modification of the terms of payment, mislead the 
other and then, when too late to make other arrange-
ments, refuse to accept the terms agreed on and defeat 
the right to exercise its option.'' 
This Court went on to say in substance that a seller is 
estopped to deny a tender of payment where, by the seller's 
own acts, it was made virtually impossible for the buyer to 
meet the terms. 
It is plaintiffs' contention that the defendant, by orally 
waiving paragraph 9 of the contract, led the plaintiffs to 
believe that they had a reasonable time in which to obtain a 
certified check and deliver the same to the defendant. 
Plaintiffs did suggest minor changes in the contract which 
were refused by defendant but plaintiffs did not withdraw 
their acceptance; nor did their suggestions constitute a rejection 
of defendant's offer. In support of this position, we respectfully 
cite 1 Williston on Contracts, 3rd Edition ( 1957) at page 261, 
Section 79, wherein is stated: 
"Frequently an offeree, while making a posthve 
acceptance of the offer, also makes a request or sug-
gestion that some addition or modification be made. 
So long as it is clear that the meaning of the acceptance 
is positively and unequivocably to accept the offer 
whether such request is granted or not, a contract is 
formed.'' 
In support of this proposition the author cites cases from 
numerous jurisdictions. 
The trial Court, in granting defendant's motion to dismiss, 
deprived plaintiffs of the jury's determintaion of a material 
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issue of fact. This Court has said on numerous occasions that 
in deciding a motion for a directed verdict, the Court rnust 
consider the evidence in a light most favorable to the party 
against whom the motion is directed and should find every 
controverted fact in his favor. Boskovich vs. Utah Construction 
Co., 123 Utah 387, 259 P. 2d 885; Finlayson vs. Brady, 121 
Utah 204, 240 P. 2d 491; Hewitt vs. The General Tire and 
Rubber Co., 3 Utah 2d 354, 284 P. 2d 471. 
Under our system of jury trials, it is the province of the 
jury and not the court to determine all questions of fact and 
to pass upon the credibility of the witnesses as they appear 
before them and testify. The court determines and decides 
questions of law and directs its application to the facts, but 
the jury is to determine the disputed facts of the case from the 
evidence adduced, in accordance with the instructions given by 
the court. 53 American Jurisprudence, Paragraph 293, Page 
248. 
Likewise, a cause should never be withdrawn from the 
jury unless it appears, as a matter of law, that a recovery 
cannot be had upon any view of the facts which the evidence 
reasonably tends to establish. If there is conflicting evidence, 
and any view that the jury might lawfully take of it will sustain 
their findings for either party, the facts should not be "rith-
drawn from them. 53 American Jurisprudence, Paragraph 299, 
page 251. 
Applying these princip1es to the instant case and viewing 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, we 
respectfully submit that the plaintiffs sustained their burden 
of proof in making a prima facie case and that the trial court 
erred in directing a verdict in favor of the defendant. 
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CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs respectfully submit that there was substantial, 
material evidence presented by which a jury could reasonably 
have found that defendant waived paragraph 9 of its contract 
and that plaintiffs thereafter accepted its offer but were de· 
prived of their right to pay the earnest money within a reason· 
able time. Defendant deliberately calculated to avoid receiving 
the earnest money payment as it had received a better offer 
for the leases. The trial Court should have submitted these 
issues to the jury but erred in granting a directed verdict and 
refusing plaintiffs a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HURD, BAYLE & HURD 
WALLACE R. LAUCHNOR 
1105 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City 1, Utah 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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